Court of
Appeals of Oregon
March 16,
1981, Argued and submitted ; May 4, 1981
CA No. 19264
Reporter
52 Ore. App.
43 * | 627 P.2d 905 ** | 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 2467 ***
STATE OF
OREGON, Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER GLEN CAPWELL, Appellant
Case Summary
Procedural
Posture
Defendant
sought reversal of his conviction in the Circuit Court, Marion County (Oregon),
for fourth-degree assault, contending that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for acquittal on the basis of insufficient evidence.
Overview
The charges
against defendant stemmed from an incident with an off-duty police officer. The
officer's wife noticed defendant in front of their house with a gas can. The
officer went outside with his nightstick to investigate and apparently startled
defendant. A scuffle ensued, defendant swinging the gas can and hitting the
officer in the arm. The officer told defendant that he was under arrest. The
defendant attempted to leave. The officer hit him around the knee with his
nightstick. The defendant reacted by swinging the gas can and kicking out.
There was no indication of bruising or any other injury to the officer. The
court reversed defendant's assault conviction, finding there was insufficient
evidence for a jury to find guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, according to the
statutory requirements. The state was required to prove that defendant's blows
caused either physical impairment or substantial pain. The case was remanded
for entry of a judgment for attempted fourth-degree assault, as the trier of
fact had found that defendant had taken a substantial step toward commission of
the assault offense. The attempt judgment was appropriate.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Outcome
The judgment
of conviction on fourth-degree assault was reversed and the cause was remanded
for entry of a new judgment and for resentencing.
Opinion
This is a
criminal case in which defendant seeks reversal of his conviction for Assault
in The Fourth Degree. ORS 163.160. Defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for acquittal on the basis of insufficient
evidence. We agree and reverse his conviction.
ORS 163.160
provides, in pertinent part, that a person commits the crime of Assault in the
Fourth Degree if he "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
physical injury to another. * * *" "Physical injury" is defined
as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." ORS
161.015(6). Defendant claims that there is no evidence that the alleged victim
suffered any impairment of his physical condition or substantial pain.
At
approximately 3 a.m. on June 1, 1980, the victim's wife noticed a man, later
identified as the defendant, standing in front of their house and carrying a
gas can. She awakened her husband, Tenderella, who is
an Oregon State Police officer. After dressing he picked up his nightstick and
went outside to investigate the matter. He told the defendant to stop where he
was. The defendant, who appeared startled, swung the gas can at Tenderella but did not hit him. Tenderella
identified himself as a police officer and began to question the defendant
about his activities. At that point, he noticed a bulge underneath the
defendant's coat and attempted to pat him down for weapons. The defendant
pulled back and swung the gas can at Tenderella
again, this time hitting him in the arm. Tenderella
testified that he felt pain, a stinging sensation, when the defendant hit him.
Tenderella
told the defendant that he was under arrest. The defendant attempted to leave
and Tenderella tried "to put him down" by
hitting him around the knee area with his nightstick. The defendant reacted by
swinging the gas can and kicking out at Tenderella.
At one point the defendant kicked him in the arm, knocking the nightstick out
of his hand. The victim testified that this "hurt." He could not
recall, however, whether the defendant was wearing soft or hard shoes.
The officer
did not know exactly how many times he was hit with the gas can. He stated that
it was a "couple of times" and that each time he stopped the blow
with his arm. He reported no sensation other than it "hurt" and was
painful. There is no indication of bruising or any other injury to the victim.
He stated that he did not seek medical treatment after the scuffle and did not
miss any work.
The question
to be answered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence in this case is
"* * * whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S Ct 2781, 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Harris, 288 Or 703, 721, 609 P2d 798 (1980); State v. Rice, 48 Or App 115, 117,
616 P2d 538, rev den 289 Or 731 (1980).
There is no
evidence that the victim suffered any impairment of his physical condition as a
result of defendant's blows. The question is whether there is sufficient
evidence to allow the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, guilt according
to the alternative statutory requirement, viz., that the victim suffered
substantial pain. We conclude that there is not.
"Substantial"
is defined as
"(1) That is or exists as a substance; having a real
existence, subsisting by itself; (2) [***5]
of ample or considerable amount, quantity or dimensions, (3) having
substance, not imaginary, unreal or apparent only; true, solid real."
Oxford English Dictionary, Compact Edition. (1971).
Substantial
pain means considerable pain. In this case, the victim testified that he had pain and that it
hurt when the defendant struck him. There is no other evidence of the degree of
the pain or that it was anything more than a fleeting sensation. The state was
required to prove that the defendant's blows caused either physical impairment
or substantial pain to the victim. We conclude that there was insufficient
evidence to support such a finding in this case.
Having
stated that the evidence is insufficient to convict defendant of the offense of
Assault in the Fourth Degree, the question remains: what disposition must be
made of this case?
Assault in
the Fourth Degree is a Class A misdemeanor. ORS 163.160. HN4 ORS 161.405
provides, in pertinent part:
"(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
when he intentionally engages in conduct which constitutes a substantial step
toward commission of the crime.
"(2) An attempt is a:
"* * *
"(e) Class B misdemeanor if the offense attempted is a
Class A misdemeanor.
"* *
*"
The Oregon Constitution,
Amend Art VII, § 3 directs:
"* * * if, in any respect, the judgment appealed from
should be changed, and the [appellate court] shall be of the opinion that it
can determine what judgment should have been entered in the court below, it
shall direct such judgment to be entered * * *."
In the
present case, the trier of fact necessarily found that defendant had taken a
"substantial step" toward commission of the assault offense. Entry of
a judgment for Attempted Assault in the Fourth Degree is appropriate.
Reversed and
remanded for entry of a new judgment and for resentencing.