General Rule:
Old or previously known reason for intense passion will not reduce what might
have been murder to voluntary manslaughter.
People v. Chevalier
131 Ill.2d 66, 136 Ill.Dec. 167, 544 N.E.2d 942 (1989).
Opinion
In each of these consolidated cases, the defendant shot and killed his wife and
was convicted of murder. Defendants do not dispute that they committed the
killings or that the killings were not legally justified. They contend that the
evidence was sufficient to warrant giving the jury an instruction on the offense
of voluntary manslaughter (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9 -- 2). The issue
common to both appeals is whether the provocation on the part of the victim was
legally adequate to reduce the homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter.
In addition, in People v. Flores, No.
67077, defendant contends that testimony that defendant had threatened his wife
was inadmissible hearsay and that the admission of this evidence constitutes
reversible error.
In each case, the appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded the case
for a new trial. (Chevalier, 167 Ill.
App. 3d 790; Flores, 168 Ill. App. 3d 636.) We granted the petitions for leave
to appeal filed by the State in both cases (107 Ill. 2d R. 315), and the actions
were consolidated for purposes of review. We reverse the judgments of the
appellate court and reinstate the convictions of murder.
The facts of each case are fully set forth in the appellate court opinions and
need not be repeated here. Although the details differ, the circumstances
surrounding the killings are similar. In each, defendant suspected his wife of
marital infidelity. Just prior to the killing, the defendant and the victim had
an argument, during which the victim admitted committing adultery and either
disparaged the defendant's sexual abilities (People
v. Chevalier) or flaunted the fact that she slept with her lover in the
marital bed (People v. Flores). The
victims were shot during these arguments. Defendant Chevalier concealed the
shooting, eventually driving from Illinois to Michigan to deposit the body along
a highway. Chevalier told a police officer that he took the body to Michigan
because the grass along the roadway there is left uncut all summer.
***
In
People v. Flores, the trial court
refused to give defendant's tendered jury instruction on the offense of
voluntary manslaughter. In People v.
Chevalier, although the trial court instructed the jury on voluntary
manslaughter, defendant contends that the instruction was erroneous; the
appellate court agreed. We need not address the accuracy of the jury
instruction, however, unless Chevalier was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter
instruction. As Chevalier appears to
concede, if the evidence did not support such an instruction, then an erroneous
instruction on the offense could not have prejudiced defendant. Accordingly, we
turn to a consideration of whether defendants were entitled to a voluntary
manslaughter instruction.
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
At the time of the offenses, section 9 -- 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961
provided as follows:
HN1 "A person who kills an
individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the
time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting
from serious provocation by:
(1)
The individual killed[.]
* * *
Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a
reasonable person." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9 -- 2.
The principles governing voluntary manslaughter based on serious provocation are
well established. "The only categories of serious provocation which have been
recognized are: 'substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or
combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender's spouse; but not mere
words or gestures or trespass to property.' (S.H.A., chap. 38, par. 9 -- 2,
Committee Comments * * *.)" ( People v.
Crews (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 331, 335.) The rule that mere words are
insufficient [*72]
provocation applies no matter how aggravated, abusive, opprobrious or
indecent the language. E.g., People v.
Neal (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 964, 967.
In Illinois, adultery with a spouse as provocation generally has been limited to
those instances where the parties are discovered in the act of adultery or
immediately before or [***6]
after such an act, and the killing immediately follows such discovery.
( People v. Harris (1984), 123 Ill.
App. 3d 899, 904; People v. Middleswart
(1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 35, 39; People v. Wax (1966), 75 Ill. App. 2d 163,
182.) A verbal communication that adultery has occurred or will occur falls
within the rule that mere words are insufficient provocation. Middleswart, 124
Ill. App. 3d at 40; see also People v.
Arnold (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047 (defendant's long-held belief that
his wife had committed adultery was not a basis for a voluntary manslaughter
instruction); contra Commonwealth v.
Schnopps (1981), 383 Mass. 178, 181, 417 N.E.2d 1213, 1215 (a sudden
admission of adultery is equivalent to a discovery of the act itself, and is
sufficient evidence of provocation).
The appellate court decisions in the cases at bar, in concluding that defendants
were entitled to the requested instruction, followed
People v. Ambro (1987), 153 Ill. App.
3d 1, which in turn relied on People v.
Ahlberg (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, and
People v. Carr (1980), 91 Ill. App.
3d 512. These cases recognize an exception to the general rule that a verbal
communication of adultery is insufficient provocation.
Ahlberg
was an appeal from a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. In the days preceding
the homicide, defendant's wife left the couple's home and told defendant she had
filed for divorce. Just before the killing, defendant's wife told him that he
had never satisfied her sexually, that she had found an older man, and that she
was going to get a divorce. Defendant then dragged his
wife from their home and beat, kicked and stomped her, causing injuries
from which she later died.
Defendant appealed, contending that he was guilty of murder or of nothing. The
court disagreed, stating:
"To follow unequivocally the rule that 'mere words['] are insufficient to cause
the provocation necessary to support a finding of guilt of voluntary
manslaughter would be in keeping with precedent and an established rule;
however, it would be a direct refutation of logic and a miscarriage of justice.
We reach this conclusion for it is not incumbent on us to determine what could
or did provoke the defendant into a state of intense passion, for by his
testimony he made such determination."
Ahlberg, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 1041.
In the first place, the court in Ahlberg
was simply incorrect in its view that it need not inquire into the nature of the
provocation which allegedly caused a state of passion. To the contrary, as we
have stated, the law recognizes only certain categories of provocation. Under
the appellate court's view in Ahlberg,
even the slightest provocation would suffice, as long as the defendant testified
that the deceased's conduct provoked intense passion. As the appellate court
correctly stated in People v. Neal
(1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 964, 969: "Passion on the part of the slayer, no matter
how violent will not relieve him from liability for murder unless it is
engendered by a serious provocation which the law recognizes as being reasonably
adequate. If the provocation is inadequate, the crime is murder.
People v. Matthews (1974), 21 Ill.
App. 3d [249], 253."
Moreover, it is obvious from the Ahlberg
opinion that the court was loath to reverse the voluntary manslaughter
conviction. Defendant in that case had been acquitted of murder; therefore,
reversal of the voluntary manslaughter conviction likely would mean that
defendant would escape any punishment for the crime. (See
People v. Thompson (1973), 11 Ill.
App. 3d 752 (a defendant charged
with murder may properly be found guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary
manslaughter, but only if the evidence establishes the necessary elements of
that offense; voluntary manslaughter conviction reversed);
People v. Delaney (1978), 63 Ill.
App. 3d 47, 50 (Linn, J., dissenting).) The court in
Ahlberg stated: "Having escaped a
guilty of murder conviction [defendant] now asks that we set aside a voluntary
manslaughter conviction even though by his own testimony the words of his wife
were such as to cause him to lose all control of himself * * *. To grant the
request of the defendant would make a mockery of the law." (
Ahlberg, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 1041.)
The court candidly stated that its holding ignored precedent and established
rules. The court's ruling in the Ahlberg
case proves the old adage, "Hard cases make bad law."
People v. Carr
(1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 512, was also an appeal from a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter. On facts similar to those in
Ahlberg, the court in Carr followed
Ahlberg and affirmed the conviction.
People v. Ambro
(1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 1, unlike
Ahlberg and Carr, was an appeal
from a murder conviction in which defendant contended that the trial court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. The
majority acknowledged the general rules we have set out, but thought that
Ahlberg and
Carr created "[a]n apparent exception
to these general rules, based on verbal revelations of infidelity and other
conduct." (153 Ill. App. 3d at 5.) Since the circumstances in
Ambro were similar to those in
Ahlberg and
Carr (a history of ongoing marital
discord, a wife who evidenced an intent to permanently leave her husband,
insulting remarks concerning the husband's masculinity, and an announcement of
adultery by the wife), the court applied the exception created by
Ahlberg and held it was
reversible error to refuse defendant's voluntary manslaughter
instruction. Ambro, 153 Ill. App. 3d
at 6-7.
Parenthetically, we fail to understand why a history of marital discord should
be a factor favoring a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The appellate court's
opinions in Ahlberg, Carr, Ambro,
Chevalier and Flores, without explanation, all list this factor as one
favoring a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Since
voluntary manslaughter requires evidence of a sudden passion, a history of
marital discord, particularly suspicions of adultery, if relevant at all, would
undermine, not support, a defendant's claim that the evidence supports a
voluntary manslaughter instruction.
Justice Lindberg dissented from that portion of the
Ambro opinion which held that
defendant presented sufficient evidence to warrant giving a voluntary
manslaughter instruction. He pointed out that "serious provocation" is a legal
standard that has been defined by this court to include adultery with the
offender's spouse. ( People v. Crews
(1967), 38 Ill. 2d 331, 335.) In his view, "'words alone [even those that carry
messages of adultery] are insufficient evidence of provocation.'" (
Ambro, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 9, quoting
People v. Arnold (1974), 17 Ill. App.
3d 1043 (bracketed language in Ambro).) He concluded that the evidence in Ambro
did not meet the legal standard of provocation. Therefore, the evidence did not
authorize or mandate the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction, and the
conviction of murder should have been affirmed.
Justice Lindberg wrote the opinion for the court in
Chevalier. He referred to his dissent
in Ambro, but stated that he felt
bound by stare decisis to follow the majority opinion in
Ambro. Chevalier, 167 Ill. App. 3d at
797 n.1.
We conclude that the "exception" to the general rule created by the
Ahlberg line of cases is an incorrect
statement of Illinois law. A fortiori, the appellate court's reliance on those
cases in Chevalier and
Flores is misplaced. Further, we
decline defendant Flores' invitation to change the law by holding that a
confession of adultery by a spouse is legally adequate provocation.
Given our rejection of the Ahlberg
line of cases, defendants' positions are unsupportable; defendants appear to
concede as much. Whatever may be the outer limits of the general rule that only
the discovery of the parties in the act of adultery, or immediately before or
after the act, will suffice as provocation, neither case falls within the rule.
In People v. Chevalier, during the
course of the marriage, the victim left the defendant three times to live with
defendant's best friend. The night before the murder, defendant discovered his
wife's soiled panties in his car but said nothing to his wife.
The next evening, he confronted his wife and said more than once that he knew
she was "messing around" again. Similarly, in
People v. Flores, defendant testified
that he suspected his wife of having an affair for approximately eight months
prior to the murder. Thus, neither case can possibly come within the rule. As
for the insulting remarks made by the victims, the
Ahlberg line of cases simply ignores
the rule that no matter how insulting, mere words are insufficient provocation.
For these reasons, we hold that in each of the cases before us, the provocation
claimed was, as a matter of law, insufficient to constitute the serious
provocation necessary to reduce the homicide from murder to voluntary
manslaughter. Accordingly, in People v.
Flores, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury a voluntary
manslaughter instruction, and in People v. Chevalier, defendant could not have
been prejudiced by an erroneous instruction on the offense. The decisions in
Ahlberg, Carr, and Ambro are
overruled to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.* * *