Definition of Forgery: The making of a false writing that has apparent legal significance by a person who has a specific intent to defraud.

State of Idaho v. May

Supreme Court of Idaho

93 Idaho 343; 461 P.2d 126; 1969 Ida. LEXIS 308 (1969)

JUDGES: McQuade, Justice. McFadden, C. J., Donaldson and Shepard, JJ., and Hagan, District Judge, concur.

The defendant-appellant, Glenn C. May found himself in need of money in the early part of June, 1964. In an effort to assuage that difficulty, he approached Brigham Horrocks for the purpose of obtaining a loan. Horrocks, the complaining witness, had lent money to the appellant on prior occasions, but he at first refused May's entreaty. The next day, however, Horrocks relented and, on the appellant's suggestion, told May that he would lend the money provided that he obtain his father as a co-signer on a note which Horrocks prepared. May then went to his father's ranch to obtain his father's signature on the note. Upon reaching his father's ranch and finding him not there, appellant then signed his father's name to the note, copying his father's handwriting in an effort to make the signature appear authentic. Although May's father had previously cosigned several notes, he had never given permission or authority for appellant to sign his name for him. Appellant's father had been obliged to pay on the last note which he had cosigned with the appellant, and had counseled Glenn against getting too far into debt.

The next day, June 9, 1964, the appellant presented the $ 4,000 note to Horrocks, bearing his own signaure and the "copy" of his father's signature, whereupon the complaining witness gave the appellant a check for $ 4,000.

Three years later, upon Horrock's complaint, appellant was charged upon information of the acts of "uttering and passing" and "forging" the note with intent to defraud under I.C. § 18-3601 and on September 18 and 19, 1967, he was tried before a jury and convicted of that charge. On November 28, 1967, District Judge Boyd R. Thomas, sitting in the place of the late Judge Paul Crane who had tried the case, pronounced sentence upon the defendant. From that conviction and sentence appellant prosecutes this appeal.

The defendant presents this Court with twenty-seven assignments of error. The principal complaint throughout this lengthy bill of particulars is that appellant was never proved to have the intent to defraud which is a necessary element of the crime of forgery. It is not entirely clear what the appellant understands to be comprehended by the requirement of this special intent. He argues, for instance, that he should have been able to prove his financial condition at the time of the forgery. It is difficult to understand how this may have tended to prove a lack of a specific intent to defraud. An impecunious forger is no less a forger merely because of his poverty. He also argues that he had no intention to defraud either Horrocks or his own father because he intended to pay the money back. And he further contends that he had no intention to defraud because he honestly thought that his father would ratify his "copied" signature and stand behind him on the debt. These contentions evidence a profound confusion as to the quality of the intent which is necessary for conviction of forgery under our statutes. The "intent to defraud" required by I.C. § 18-3601 is simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were genuine in order to gain some advantage, generally at someone else's expense. n3 It, thus, does not matter that the defendant meant to repay the loan or thought that his father would stand by him. As Professor Perkins says, in the most recent edition of his treatise on criminal law,

"The actual accomplishment of fraud is not a necessary element of forgery, and the intent itself does not require the contemplation of inflicting a monetary loss. * * * An intent to use [or make] a false writing to gain some advantage is an intent to defraud even if the wrongdoer has an intent to make reparation at some future time. Thus, it is no defense to a charge of forging a promissory note that the forger intended to take up the paper at maturity, or even that he has actually done so. And an intent to use an instrument to which the signature of another is wrongfully attached is fraudulent even if that other actually owes the forger the amount of money represented and this is merely a device used to collect the debt. These results are necessary because the social interest in the integrity of instruments is violated by the use of false writings, even under these circumstances. Furthermore, a false writing has such an obvious tendency to accomplish fraud that the jury is warranted in inferring such an intent from the mere creation of an instrument that is false, or the alteration which changes a genuine writing into a false one, unless some adequate explanation is offered * * *.

"The fact that the one whose name was forged is willing to condone the offense and pay the obligation is no defense to forgery."

The jury is, of course the final arbiter of the facts, and we cannot, as a matter of law, hold that the jury in this case could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite intent when he forged and uttered the note in 1964.

Appellant, as his twenty-fourth assignment of error, challenges the trial court's instruction no. 16,

"If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the promissory note in evidence before you, as Exhibit 'A', was forged and counterfeited on or about the 8th day of June, 1964, and that the defendant had the promissory note in his possession on that day and passed it to Mr. Brig Horrocks as genuine and true, then such possession and passing of the promissory note are incriminating circumstances tending to show that the defendant either forged the promissory note or knew that it had been forged, unless the evidence satisfactorily explains the possession and passing of the promissory note by the defendant, if you find that he did possess and pass the promissory note."

This instruction appears manifestly to be a correct statement of the law. It has been held in this state, n6 and in others, that a person possessing a recently forged document, or passing it, is presumed either to have forged it or to have the necessary intention to defraud. This is a rebuttable presumption, but it does shift the burden to the defendant to explain his incriminating conduct. We can see no reason to upset this well established rule of evidence.

* * *

We have examined the remainder of the appellant's assignments of error, and, while they are strenuously argued, we hold them to be without merit.

The judgment and sentence of the district court is affirmed.